Error announcements shall in principle unfold both a preventative and a sanctioning function via adverse publicity. While US research provides large and unambiguous evidence of sanctions which are based on capital market reactions, but also personal consequences of responsible managers and auditors, the few studies which investigated the German enforcement system do not yield comparable results, thereby questioning its efficacy. Building on this, we first investigate for the German enforcement setting whether error announcements lead to abnormal turnover of audit teams and audit firms than comparable non-error firms by using logistic regression. Second, we analyze whether audit team or audit firm turnover results in improved accounting quality. To do so, we proxy accounting quality with well-established earnings management models and explore the turnover's impact on accounting quality with a difference-in-difference approach. Our results do not provide evidence of increased audit firm turnover due to error announcements, thereby contradicting studies from the US; the same holds for changes of the responsible audit teams. However, our results suggest that firms with changes of the audit firm or audit team exhibit an increase in accounting quality, which how-ever takes place already in the time gap between error announcement and auditor change. Consequently, we interpret auditor changes serving as a signal of improved corporate governance, rather than indeed improving corporate governance.
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides additional insights in shareholder perceptions of error announcements in the German enforcement setting by investigating potential impacts on abnormal auditor 11 turnover. The German enforcement system consists of the private Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) and the securities authority Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs-aufsicht (BaFin). This two-tier mechanism has started its reviewing activities on July 1, 2005 , and is supposed to ensure a preventative and sanctioning function via adverse publicity in case of error findings.
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For the sake of linguistic simplicity, in the following the term 'auditor' comprises both the audit firm and the personally responsible auditors (i.e., the audit team) who conduct the audit. Only if we need to explicitly distinguish between the audit firm and the audit team, we use the more concrete terms 'audit firm' and 'audit team'.
Research provides numerous studies on the beneficial effect of enforcement institutions, both with regard to its preventative and sanctioning function. With regard to the preventative function, several cross-country studies highlight the positive effect of enforcement, both stand-alone and in connection with IFRS adoption ( Turning to the sanctioning function, to date the vast majority of studies investigate the US enforcement setting: They provide mostly unambiguous evidence that restatements negatively affect investor reactions and analysts' forecasts (Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996) and financial statement credibility (Wilson, 2008) , to name but a few, but also lead to higher turnover of responsible managers Notwithstanding this rich universe of studies, we must admit that there is only little evidence on the German enforcement system to date. First studies cast doubt on pronounced capital-market effects due to error announcements (Hitz et al., 2012; Ebner et al., 2015), furthermore research observes increased audit firm turnover already before the publication of detected accounting errors (Brocard et al., 2017) , thereby putting the interaction between enforcement and shareholder monitoring into perspective. Similar limited evidence holds for the expected deterrence mechanism of error announcements on future earnings management activities (Böcking et al., 2015) , which can be observed in the US setting though. Consequently and based on the notion that the US results might not be transferable, we feel encouraged to shed further light on the genuine German setting.
Motivated by the contradicting findings on the role of adverse publicity on auditor turnover in the US and German setting, we extend the analysis of Brocard et al. (2017) by distinguishing between changes of the audit firm -which can be considered well-investigated by now -, and changes of the responsible audit team which conducts the audit. We argue that changing the responsible audit team while keeping the audit firm might be a suitable compromise between signaling improved corporate governance and maintaining relations to the audit firm, which might also be characterized by nonaudit services. In addition, we aim to bridge the gap between the expected sanctioning and preventative function of enforcement by analyzing whether changes of the audit firm or the audit team yield enhanced accounting quality or shall solely aim to achieve a 'labeling effect'. To recapitulate, our study investigates whether audit teams or rather audit firms are more likely to be replaced around error announcements and which of either two changes does later lead to comparably higher accounting quality. We argue that the change of the audit firm is more likely to result in better accounting quality as the new audit firm can be considered to work more independently compared to a new audit team: A new audit team might still have to pay attention to existing relations with the client (e.g., non-audit services). By changing the perspective, it can be however also presumed that a company might choose to replace rather the audit firm -instead of the audit team -in order to achieve a stronger signal or stronger label of improved accounting quality to and for its shareholders. Thus, our analysis should be of also interest to shareholders who need to assess such signals of improved accounting quality and decide whether to take them at face value or not.
We examine a sample of 99 German firms that are subject to an error announcement in the period 2006-2012 and compare their auditor and audit firm turnover with those of non-error control companies that are most similar in size and industry. Contrary to prior US evidence and in line with the study of Brocard et al. (2017), we cannot provide evidence that error announcements are associated with higher audit firm turnover; running counter to our expectations, this also holds for changes of the responsible auditors.
Based on two small subsamples of the error sample, we can show that firms with auditor changes exhibit increased accounting quality; however, this effect already takes place in the gap year between error announcement and auditor turnover, thereby hinting at the fact that auditor changes are not the main driver of enhanced accounting quality, but shall rather serve as a signal to a firm's stakeholders that accounting quality improved in the aftermath of detected accounting errors.
The structure of our paper is as follows: Section 2 sheds light on the institutional background of the German enforcement system and section 3 presents prior researchers' findings and our hypotheses development. Thereafter, section 4 describes our employed methodology, followed by the study's results. After presenting the findings of various robustness tests in section 6, we conclude in section 7.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: THE GERMAN ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
The German enforcement system is rooted in the socalled 'IAS Regulation' (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) which requires companies listed in a regulated market in the EU to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS. Driven by the conviction that a 'proper and rigorous enforcement regime is key to underpinning investor confidence in financial markets' (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Para. 16), the 'IAS Regulation' furthermore requires EU member states to ensure the consistent and faithful application of IFRS by appropriate enforcement mechanisms. While enforcement of accounting standards thus remains an issue performed at a national level, several activities coordinated by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR, since 2011 replaced by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)) strive to provide guidance on a common approach to enforcement.
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Before 2004, enforcement of accounting standards in Germany was only carried out by independent auditors and internal corporate governance mechanisms. In order to keep pace with the above-mentioned developments and additionally driven by several accounting scandals in Germany and abroad, 13 , we focus our depiction on its most essential features that might be helpful in understanding the subsequent hypotheses development.
On the first stage, FREP conducts both proactive and reactive reviews of the most recently published financial reports. Proactive investigations are based on a random-and risk-based selection process that accounts for some 80-85% of total investigations. This procedure is designed to ensure that all companies are regularly reviewed in dependence of their stock index listing, which is once in 4-5 years for DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX companies, and once in 8-10 years for the remaining companies (FREP, 2009). Reactive investigations account for the remaining 15-20% of reviews and are conducted in case of specific information on accounting malfeasance or on request of BaFin. If a company refuses to cooperate with FREP or to accept FREP's findings, the case enters the second stage and is handed over to BaFin which is equipped with the authoritative power to enforce the review procedure. In case that either FREP or BaFin detect non-compliance with IFRS, the respective company is required to publish the established error in the federal gazette (Bundesanzeiger). Error detection and announcement mark the end of each caserelated investigation procedure.
In contrast to other enforcement institutions that complement adverse publicity with additional sanctioning mechanisms (Rashkover and Winter, 2005 and 2006; Berger, 2010), the German enforcement system solely relies on error announcements to ensure the politically postulated preventative and sanctioning function (German Government, 2004) . Focusing on the years 2005-2012 as the basis of this study, FREP has conducted 848 investigations which yielded 192 detected errors. While this is equivalent to an error rate of 23%, it must be noted that the normalized error rate -which is adjusted for multiple counting of single errors and examinations that confirm known errors (FREP, 2011) -materially declined in the years 2011 and 2012. Nevertheless, the normalized error rate still adds up to 20% in the whole sample period. Though other European countries exhibit similar error rates (Berger, 2010; for converse US evidence see Hitz et al., 2012), this number is remarkable and hints at a possible failure of the existing enforcement mechanisms in the form of external auditor and supervisory board (Böcking et al., 2015) (see Table 1 in the appendix). By constituting a further pivotal part of a company's corporate governance, the auditor indisputably is in charge of ensuring the preparation of financial statements in accordance with applicable accounting standards. Consequently, erroneous financial accounting must be regarded as a result of audit failure (Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Stanley and DeZoort, 2007) . This is all the more serious considering that investors are reliant on correct financial reporting in order to properly perform their investment decisions and -in combination with other internal and external corporate governance mechanisms -supervisory activities (Höltken and Ebner). These arguments support calls for an auditor change, however it must be kept in mind that such a shift also poses the risk of potential switching costs. The latter might be driven by learning-curve effects of the auditor in charge (Johnson et al., 2002) and industry specialization (Agrawal and Cooper, 2016) .
PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Previous research
Notwithstanding the advanced number of studies covering the impact of adverse publicity on management and director fluctuation, the effect on auditor turnover has not been extensively investigated yet. (2017) investigate the effect of erroneous financial statements on changes of the audit firm, labeling the association between the two variables as highly significant. Moreover, the authors also examine the impact of error announcements on changes of the audit firm; however, the level of significance is slightly below ten percent, thereby indicating that auditor changes rather take place prior to publication of detected errors. Consequently, Brocard et al. (2017) do provide evidence of management instead of shareholder reactions to erroneous financial statements. Notwithstanding, evidence on the change of the auditors in chargeinstead of the audit firm -is still missing to date.
Bridging the gap between the two depicted streams of literature -stakeholder perceptions of adverse publicity and changes in corporate governance -, the question remains whether such an interdependence is basically the result of a 'labeling effect', i.e. that firms only pretend to improve corporate governance; or whether stakeholder reactions truly reflect improvements in corporate governance. While Wiedmann and Hendricks (2013) show that US restatement companies switching to a lower-quality audit firm exhibit a lower accounting quality, comparable evidence for Germany is still missing to date. Böcking et al. (2015) solely investigate the effect of error announcements on earnings quality without controlling for changes in corporate governance structures, but find no statistically significant improvement. Consequently, research does not provide support for the postulated preventive function due to error announcements in the German setting.
Hypotheses development
As described above, prior literature hints at an association between restatements or AAERs and audit firm turnover, however only for the US setting.
In Germany, first evidence cannot clearly support the hypothesis of increased audit firm changes due to error announcements, since corresponding consequences apparently take place already prior to publication of established accounting errors.
Being the first part of our analysis, we focus on the interrelation between error announcements and shareholder monitoring instead of management reactions, thereby investigating the role of enforcement and its outcomes (i.e., error announcements) in the functioning of corporate governance. Going beyond the work of Brocard et al.
(2017), we are not solely interested in changes of the auditing firm, but additionally exploit a feature of German audits by investigating changes of the personally responsible auditors, i.e. the employed audit team. 15 We argue that between the poles of no change and change of the audit firm, keeping the audit firm and simultaneously changing the audit team might constitute a further possibility of shareholder reaction. This might be of special interest for those auditor-client relationships that go beyond the pure audit of financial statements, but also entail non-audit services. Consequently, we state our first set of hypotheses as follows:
H1a: Companies with an error announcement exhibit higher audit firm turnover than comparable companies without an error announcement.
H1b: Companies with an error announcement exhibit higher audit team turnover than comparable companies without an error announcement.
Based on the findings of H1a and H1b and pursuing prior US evidence by Wiedmann and Hendricks (2013), we want to find out whether those companies that change the audit firm or the audit team due to an error publication indeed yield improvements in accounting quality, which might justify the observed attenuated stakeholder reactions in response to error announcements. On the other hand, it appears possible that companies solely change the auditor in order to blame a scapegoat for the detected accounting errors, but actually are not interested in improving accounting compliance; we call this a pure 'labeling effect'. In this case, we would not expect accounting quality to change materially.
H2a: Error firms with a change of the audit firm exhibit an increase of accounting quality, compared to error firms without an auditor change.
H2b: Error firms with a change of the audit team exhibit an increase of accounting quality, compared to error firms without an auditor change.
METHODOLOGY
Auditor turnover
Being a pivotal variable of our analyses, we extend prior definitions of auditor by distinguishing between the audit firm and the responsible auditors who conduct the audit, i.e. the audit team. Given the fact that the latter are apparent in German auditor reports, we can easily supplement our analyses with this detailed feature. 16 For the sake of completeness, we also examine the years [-1;0] in order to account for auditor changes on behalf of the management (CHANGEFIRM[-1;0]). Nonetheless, the focus of our paper is shareholders' reaction on error announcements, which we assume to take place after the public disclosure of the error. The coding of the years is congruent with calendar years, consequently an error announcement in December of year t and election of a new audit firm in March of year t+1 is coded as auditor turnover in the event window [0;1]. We focus on audit firm elections in shareholders' meetings in order to identify audit firm turnover.
In order to avoid a change of the audit firm's name being classified as audit firm change, we additionally pay attention to the names of the audit team; thus, if the audit team remains the same, but the audit firm changes, we do not code an auditor turnover. Though these cases happen in only a few cases, we regard our approach of manually collecting the dependent variable as being superior compared to prior studies from the US that rely on conventional database solutions.
Equivalently to the change of the audit firm, we define the change of the audit team. By doing so, we create the binary variables CHANGETEAM[0;1] and CHANGETEAM[0;2] in case that both personally responsible auditors change in the one or two years subsequent to the error announcement, respectively. In line with audit firm change, we complement our analyses with a change of the audit team in the year before the error announcement (CHANGETEAM [1;0] ). It is noteworthy that the different variations of CHANGETEAM comprise both companies that kept the audit firm and those that did not, with the change of the audit team being the only determining factor.
Earnings management
We follow prior literature and proxy accounting quality with earnings management metrics in form of discretionary accruals models (see e. Based on this definition, we estimate the following coefficients in order to obtain nondiscretionary accruals:
18 Jones (1991):
Dechow et al. (1995):
Kothari et al. (2005):
We estimate industry-year specific coefficients 19 of the models above for a population of all German firms with listed equity in the regulated market, which we obtain at ESMA's website. 20 Following conventions, we exclude foreign and financial companies; moreover, we require a minimum of 5 observations for each industry-year combination. 21 Thereafter, we use the calculated coefficients for the error sample (adjusted by financial companies) only, i.e. a subsample of the population above, in order to obtain nondiscretionary accruals. The difference of total and non-discretionary accruals yields discretionary accruals as our proxy for earnings management.
Research approach
Our research approach is twofold, given the two sets of hypotheses and the corresponding streams of analyses. Starting with hypotheses H1a and H1b, we investigate the impact of error announcements on auditor changes. We do so by conducting univariate tests that simply compare the mean of the error and control sample for each of the auditor change variables described above (labeled as CHANGE in the The variable of interest ERROR partitions the error and control sample, taking the value one for error firms and zero otherwise. In line with prior literature, 22 we include additional variables that are designed to control for alternative drivers of auditor turnover; they are explained in detail in Table 2 , Panel A.
Turning to the investigation of hypotheses H2a and H2b, we conduct a univariate analysis, too. Given the fact that earnings management activities might also be driven by macroeconomic developments -which presumably does not hold for auditor turnover 23 -, we identify the change in earnings management activities before and after the auditor change, compared with a control sample of firms that does not change the auditor subsequent to error announcements. By doing so, we obtain the difference-in-differences (DiD), which is supposed to isolate the effect of auditor turnover on earnings management (see also Daske et al., 2008; Ebner et al., 2015):
In order to additionally investigate the impact of the error announcement on earnings management, we calculate the difference in earnings management around the public error detection:
By doing so, we aim to catch a glimpse on whether the auditor change is the actual driver of changes in earnings management, or whether accounting quality already improved after the error publication, thereby reducing the auditor change to a signal of improved corporate governance in the communication with the stakeholders. Due to limited data availability for auditor changes in [0;1], we only investigate the impact of earnings management for auditor changes in [0;2]. Consequently, the post-change year is two years after the error announcement.
We incorporate alternative drivers of accounting quality by additionally conducting a regression analysis with the following equation: 23 As a matter of fact, we do not know any auditor turnover study that employs a difference-in-difference design, arguably since the expected value of auditor turnover is zero, i.e. normally we do not expect a firm to change its audit firm or auditors. 
CHANGE denotes our variable of interest by partitioning the error sample in two subsamples: one subsample with an auditor change subsequent to the error announcement, and one subsample without corresponding auditor change. POST_CHANGE is a binary variable that takes the value one for periods after the auditor change. In order to obtain the DiD in the multivariate analysis, we employ an interaction term POST_CHANGE*CHANGE (for a similar approach, see e.g. Ebner et al., 2015b).
Similar to the univariate analyses and the distinction between POST_DETECT and POST_CHANGE, we also conduct a multivariate analysis with the respective interaction term POST_DETECTxCHANGE in order to obtain the DiD: Table 2 in the appendix).
Sample selection
The study is based on a sample of German firms that have been subject to error announcements by FREP or BaFin within the years 2006-2012. 24 A search in the federal gazette (Bundesanzeiger), which is the compulsory publication medium of error announcements, yields 186 results. 25 After merging 6 error announcements that have been separately published at the same day for the single and consolidated accounts of 3 companies, 183 findings remain. A double check with Handelsblatt and Börsenzeitung, two prestigious German business newspapers and stock exchange gazettes, confirms these results. Based on this starting point, we conduct the following adjustments: we exclude 16 error announcements from firms which are headquartered abroad and 13 error announcements that are solely clarifications of prior error announcements. In order to ensure comparable corporate governance settings, we delete 7 firms without listed equity. Due to constrained data availability in Worldscope, we exclude additional 27 companies. Furthermore, 16 error announcements are deleted since the corresponding firms do not provide information about their auditors in the two years surrounding the error announcements. Ultimately and to avoid double counting, we merge 2 error announcements that have been published by the same company within a single year. Given this selection process, we remain with a final sample of 103 error announcements.
In order to examine auditor turnover and its determinants, we compare the sample of error firms with a control sample. Following prior literature both in the field of auditor turnover (Kryzanowski and Zhang, 2013; Agrawal and Cooper, 2016) and with regard to the German enforcement system (Ernstberger et al., 2012a; Strohmenger, 2013 and 2014; Puritscher, 2015), we assign one comparable company to each error firm. The control sample is drawn from the population of firms with listed equity on a German stock market, which is available at ESMA's website. 26 Apart from a small number of companies with listed debt only, this is the universe of companies which are subject to enforcement by FREP and BaFin.
For the sake of comparability, the control firms must meet the following requirements: They must (1) not exhibit an error announcement during the investigation period, (2) apply the same accounting standards, (3) have the same industry classification according to the ICB code, (4) be headquartered in Germany and (5) most similar in size, measured by total assets, with the error firm. We exclude 4 companies from the control sample since they do not provide sufficient auditor-related information. Since the matching procedure requires congruence of error and control sample, the subsequent analyses are based on a sample of 99 error and control firms, respectively.
The ensuing analysis of earnings management activities is based on the error sample only, reduced by 28 companies of the financial sector. Since some observations lack data which is required for the calculation of discretionary accruals, this leaves us with 45 companies (180 firm-year observations) in the final analysis.
RESULTS
Data, descriptive statistics and correlations
We collect the data on auditor turnover from companies' annual reports; all other data is obtained from Worldscope. proportions for the variable EXPERT, but higher values of LEV and LOSS. Smaller values of ROA and GROWTH additionally hint at the fact that error firms perform worse in economic terms than their non-error counterparts, thereby confirming the findings of prior studies on the German enforcement system that apply a similar matching approach (see Strohmenger, 2014). Table 3 , Panel C, shows the descriptive statistics of the error sample only, however for an investigation period of four years (one year prior to two years after the error announcement). The variables which are also comprised in Panel A exhibit similar values, suggesting that the small subsample of our additional analysis is representative for the error sample and not subject to a selection or survivorship bias (see Table 3 in the appendix). Table 4 in the appendix).
Univariate results
Univariate results on auditor turnover are shown in Table 5 , which is partitioned in two panels according to the change of the audit firm or the audit team. Panel A, which covers the change of the audit firm, shows that -contrary to prior beliefsthe error sample exhibits less audit firm turnover, compared with the control sample which lacks erroneous financial reporting. Turning the view to the fluctuation of the audit teams depicts a slightly different picture, with CHANGETEAM[-1;0] indicating increased audit team turnover prior to error announcements (one-tailed p-value of 0.11). While the error sample still exhibits increased audit team turnover for the subsequent period, it lacks statistical significance (see Table 5 in the appendix).
We present the univariate results of changes in accounting quality in Table 6 , paying special attention to the DiD of the error detection and the auditor change. With regard to a change of the audit firm (CHANGEFIRM[0;2]), we find some evidence of decreased earnings management after the error announcement, which is mostly statistically significant for signed discretionary accruals (onetailed p-value of 0.04 for the model of Dechow et al., 1995) . In contrast, the change of the audit firm does not yield comparable results.
Turning to the change of the audit team (CHANGETEAM[0;2]), we notice slight evidence of decreased earnings management (absolute discretionary accruals) after a change of the audit team, with all other measures being clearly insignificant. Summing up, we find some evidence of increased accounting quality after the error announcement, but non-consistent results for the effect of an auditor change. Consequently, the results hint at a 'labeling effect', which means that those firms with an auditor change improve their accounting quality already before this pivotal step (see Table 6 in the appendix). However, we caution to blindly interpret these findings, since the estimated models are not statistically significant (Prob > Chi² above 0.10). Consequently, we refer to the robustness test section which yields statistically significant models in most specifications for the alternative control samples (see Table 7 in the appendix). Table 8 comprises the regression results for earnings management activities and their drivers for the subsample of 45 error firms. Being interested in the DiD, we focus on the interaction terms which are supposed to capture the effect of error announcements and auditor changes apart from sole changes of earnings management over time. In contrast to our hypotheses H2a and H2b, the results do not indicate significant associations of both interaction terms with the earnings management metrics employed. Thus, we cannot find evidence of error announcements or auditor changes on earnings management metrics, being our proxy for accounting quality (see Table 8 in the appendix).
Multivariate results
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Since the results of our study crucially depend on the comparability of error and control firms and consequently on the applied matching procedure, we rerun the analyses outlined above with alternative control samples in order to validate our results (see Table 9 ). While the initial control sample is matched according to ICB industry classification and total assets as firm size proxy, we also conduct matching procedures with market capitalization (Control sample 2) or Fama-French 12-industry classification (Control  sample  3) instead. Furthermore, we construct control sample 4 by matching firms according to their Fama-French 12-industry classification and market capitalization. With regard to the univariate results, we find counterintuitive increased audit firm turnover for the control samples, sometimes even scratching at statistical significance. In contrast, the error firms exhibit consistently higher audit team turnover, which mostly is quite close to conventional levels of statistical significance (see Table 9 in the appendix).
We additionally provide additional analyses for the univariate earnings management results by employing alternative proxies for accounting quality. Specifically, we use the metrics of Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002) , which are conceptually similar to the discretionary accrual models used before, while paying more emphasis on working-capital accruals and their explanation by cash flows from past, current and future periods. While the non-signed discretionary accruals after the error publication clearly hints at increased accounting quality, all other DiDs remain insignificant. Consequently, we cannot replicate our findings from above with the alternative accounting quality measures, highlighting the role of the employed proxies on the results gained (see Tables  10-12 in the appendix).
CONCLUSION
In this study we investigate the association between error announcements in the German enforcement setting and subsequent turnover of the audit firm or the personally responsible auditors; furthermore, we enhance this picture by shedding light on the effect of the named changes on accounting quality. Consequently, we regard our study as a further mosaic stone in the universe of studies dealing with the unique German enforcement system and particularly its proclaimed preventative and sanctioning function. In line previous evidence of Brocard et al. (2017), we cannot provide evidence of increased audit firm turnover due to error announcements, thereby contradicting studies from the US; the same holds for changes of the responsible auditors. Additionally, we can detect enhanced accounting quality in the aftermath of error announcements for those companies that switch their auditor or audit team. However, this effect cannot be attributed to changes in corporate governance, since it takes place in the gap year between error announcement and auditor turnover. Thus, the latter arguably fulfils a 'labeling' function, serving as a signal of restored accounting quality to stakeholders.
Our study contributes to existing literature by extending scarce evidence of personal consequences due to financial misreporting in the German setting. While we cannot infer clear evidence on the effectiveness of the German enforcement system, the findings hint at the fact that error announcements do not yield abnormal auditor changes, which in turn does not provide support for the politically postulated sanctioning function. In contrast, our analyses of changes in accounting quality suggests the presence of the expected preventative function, at least for the subsample of firms with changes in corporate governance. 
LTTNR STTNR EXPERT
Binary variable that is coded as one if the audit firm or audit team has been employed for five or more years at the date of the error announcement.
Binary variable that is coded as one if the audit firm or audit team has been employed for less than three years at the date of the error announcement.
Binary variable that is coded as one if the audit firm is accountable for most of the audits in the relevant industry, according to the ICB industry classification. The calculation is based on the sample of companies with listed equity in the regulated market in Germany.
Control variables
Error announcement
Number of business segments the firm reports for. Ratio of total liabililies over total assets in the year of the error announcement.
Negative income
Firm growth GROWTH LOSS
Business segments SEG
Natural logarithm of total assets in the year of the error announcement. POST_DETECT Binary variable that is coded as one for the year of the error announcement (i.e., affects financial statements for the year after the error announcement), and zero otherwise.
Control variables
SIZE
Natural logarithm of total assets in the year of the error announcement.
EISSUE
Worldscope Worldscope
DISSUE
Percentage change in total liabilities in the year of the error announcement.
Worldscope OCF Operating cashflow scaled by total assets in the year of the error announcement.
Worldscope POST_CHANGE Binary variable that is coded as one for the year of the change of the audit firm or the audit team (i.e., affects financial statements for the year after the change of the audit firm or the audit team), and zero otherwise.
POST_CHANGExCHANGE
Interaction term that captures the difference-in-differences, i.e. the effect of error announcements for those firms that will subsequently change their audit firm or audit team. Notes: Panel A and B depict the descriptive statistics for the control variables of the multivariate analyses of audit firm or auditor change, separately for the error and control sample. Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables of the multivariate analyses of earnings management activities, covering 4 years per error company (1 year prior to two years after the error announcement). Since data availability is required for all variables, Panel C exhibits comparatively few firm-year observations due to restricted data coverage. Notes: Compared with the error sample, control sample 2 exhibits the best match in terms of ICB industry classification and market capitalization, control sample 3 exhibits the best match in terms of Fama-French 12-industry classification and total assets, and control sample 4 exhibits the best match in terms of Fama-French 12-industry classification and market capitalization. Notes: This table shows results from logistic regressions of auditor change in one and two subsequent years after an error announcement on the variables of interest and control variables. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
